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Optimal  Re insurance  and Dividend Payment S t r a t e g i e s  
P a n t e l i s  P e c h l i v a n i d e s  ' 
I.  I n t r o d u c t i o n  
The r i s k  r e s e r v e s *  of  a n  i n s u r a n c e  company ( I . C . )  can  be 
viewed a s  a  random walk over  t i m e .  For  t h e  example o f  a  d i s -  
crete  t i m e  c a s e ,  w e  c a n  w r i t e  
where 
Rt:  t h e  r i s k  r e s e r v e s  a t  s t a r t  of  p e r i o d  t ;  
pt : t h e  premiums c o l l e c t e d  d u r i n g  p e r i o d  t ;  
S t :  t h e  c l a i m s  d u r i n g  p e r i o d  t (a  random v a r i a b l e ) .  
A t  t h e  end of each  y e a r ,  t h e  I . C .  must d e c i d e  how much of 
t h e  r i s k  r e s e r v e s  t o  pay o u t  a s  d i v i d e n d .  They must a l s o  d e c i d e  
how t o  r e i n s u r e ,  t h i s  b e i n g  a  w a y ' t o  t r a n s f o r m  t h e  r i s k  t h e  
company c a r r i e s  by s h a r i n g  it w i t h  a n o t h e r  company. 
The problem r e s e m b l e s  t h e  consumption-investment  problems 
c o n s i d e r e d  i n  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e  connected  w i t h  s e c u r i t i e s  m a r k e t s ,  
and t h u s  i n s p i r e d  t h e  approach used i n  t h i s  s t u d y .  
I n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g ,  w e  w i l l  c o n s i d e r  a n  I . C .  w i t h  u t i l i t y  
over  t i m e  r e p r e s e n t e d  by t h e  d i s c o u n t e d  sum of u t i l i t i e s  of 
' u n i v e r s i t y  of  C a l i f o r n i a ,  Berke ley ,  C a l i f o r n i a ,  U .  S .A. 
T h i s  p a p e r  i s  based  upon a  Ph.D. t h e s i s  t o  be  s u b m i t t e d  t o  t h e  
U n i v e r s i t y  o f  C a l i f o r n i a ,  Berke ley .  
* 
The t e r m  " r i s k  r e s e r v e s "  l o o s e l y  r e f e r s  t o  t h e  r e s e r v e  
c a p i t a l  k e p t  by a  company t o  f a c e  c l a i m s .  I n  o t h e r  words, it 
i s  t h e  working c a p i t a l .  
e a c h  pe r iod .**  The dynamic programming r e l a t i o n  f o r  t h e  N- 
p e r i o d  problem w i l l  t h e n  be  f o r m u l a t e d .  I n  S e c t i o n  111, w e  
w i l l  f i n d  a closed-form s o l u t i o n  f o r  a class of  u t i l i t y  func-  
t i o n s  known as  t h e  L i n e a r  Risk T o l e r a n c e  class  ( t h i s  w i l l  be  
d e f i n e d  l a t e r ) .  The s o l u t i o n s  w i l l  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  d i v i d e n d  
payments shou ld  be  p r o p o r t i o n a l  t o  r i s k  r e s e r v e s .  
The form of  the r e i n s u r a n c e  t r e a t y  w i l l  b e  independen t  
of t h e  company's w e a l t h .  I t  w i l l  depend on i t s  u t i l i t y  func-  
t i o n ,  t h e  p r i c e  of  r e i n s u r a n c e ,  and t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  d e n s i t y  
f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  claims ( 5 ) .  The w e a l t h  of  t h e  company w i l l  
o n l y  d e t e r m i n e  t h e  amount of r e i n s u r a n c e .  
These r e s u l t s  and some g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s  w i l l  be  d i s c u s s e d  
i n  S e c t i o n  I V .  
11. The Model 
A. D e s c r i p t i o n  of  t h e  I n s u r a n c e  Company 
The I . C .  i s  f a c e d  w i t h  an  N-period problem. W e  w i l l  c o u n t  
t h e  p e r i o d s  backwards and c a l l  t h e  i n t e r v a l  (t,t-11, t h e  t t h  
p e r i o d .  Thus, ( 1 , O )  i s  t h e  f i r s t  p e r i o d  ( b u t  i s  i n  r e a l i t y  
t h e  l a s t ) .  
The r e l e v a n t  v a r i a b l e s  are: 
Pt: t h e  premium c o l l e c t e d  d u r i n g  p e r i o d  t: ( f o r  s i m p l i c -  
i t y  t h i s  i s  assumed t o  b e  c o l l e c t e d  a t  t h e  end of 
t h e  p e r i o d )  ; 
t t :  t h e  c l a i m s  d u r i n g  p e r i o d  t ,  a p o s i t i v e  random v a r i a b l e  
o v e r  t h e  i n t e r v a l  X t ,  whose v a l u e  w i l l  b e  x t ;  ( f o r  
s i m p l i c i t y  t h i s  is  assumed t o  be  r e a l i z e d  a t  t h e  end 
of t h e  p e r i o d )  ; 
ct: t h e  d i v i d e n d  payment a t  t h e  s t a r t  of p e r i o d  t f o r  u s e  
i n  p e r i o d  t + 1; 
* *  
llleyer [ 2 ]  h a s  shown t h a t  o t h e r  forms f o r  e v a l u a t i n g  con- 
sumption programs might  b e  a p p r o p r i a t e ;  w e  w i l l  c o n s i d e r  such  
cases i n  S e c t i o n  I V .  
Rt : t h e  r i s k  r e s e r v e s  l e v e l  a t  t h e  s t a r t  of  pe r i od  t 
b e f o r e  d i v i d e n d s  a r e  pa id ;  
mt(xl:  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  d e n s i t y  f u n c t i o n  of t h e  r . v .E t t  
assumed t o  e x i s t  f o r  X E X  t '  
B.  U t i l i t y  F u n c t i on  of t h e  I . C .  
W e  assume t h a t  t h e  I . C .  can  e x p r e s s  p r e f e r e n c e s  over  
s t r eams  of d i v i d en d  payments - c - (c , c  N N-lt* . .,cl ,co) ; it d o e s  
s o  by u s i n g  a d i s co u n t ed  form of t h e  u t i l i t i e s  of each  pe r i od .  
Thus f o r  u n c e r t a i n  d iv idend  s t r e ams ,  t h e  I . C .  e x p r e s s e s  
p r e f e r e n c e s  by l o o k i n g  a t  t h e  expected  v a l u e  of U(c). 
Remark: A s  p r e v i o u s l y  s t a t e d ,  Meyer [ 2 ]  h a s  shown t h a t  forms 
o t h e r  t h a n  E q .  (1) might be  a p p r o p r i a t e .  S p e c i f i c a l l y ,  he 
showed t h a t  i f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  ( o r  company) d e c i d e s  on f u t u r e  
consumption s t r e am s  independen t ly  of  t h e  ( i t s )  p a s t  consumption, 
t h e  o n l y  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n s  p o s s i b l e  a r e :  
N 
(iii) U ( . g l  = - n ( C  1 1  I u k ( - ) < O t  Yk 
k=o [ - U ~ - k  N-k 
k S e t t i n g  u ~ - ~ ( - )  = a u ( - )  w e  a g a i n  g e t  E q .  (1) a s  above. 
Cases (ii) and (iii) w i l l  be d i s c u s s e d  i n  S e c t i o n  I V  where 
closed-form r e s u l t s  w i l l  b e  found f o r  some one-period u t i l i t y  
f u n c t i o n s .  
C .  Reinsurance  
L e t  u s  assume t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a  r e i n s u r e r  who i s  r e a d y  t o  
a c c e p t  any r i s k  f o r  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  premium. The way i n  which 
he q u o t e s  premiums i s  a s  f o l l o w s :  f o r  a  r . v . $  (we deno te  i t s  
v a l u e  a s  y )  w i t h  r a n g e  Y ,  he forms a  p r i c e  f u n c t i o n  P  ( y )  > 0, 
'4 
~ E Y ,  and t h e  premium which he a s k s  t o  assume I$ i s  
I f  P [ $ ]  d o e s  n o t  e x i s t  t h e n  t h e  r e i n s u r e r  d o e s  n o t  a c c e p t  
t h e  r i s k  $. I n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  w e  w i l l  assume t h a t  t h e  r i s k s  
a r e  a c c e p t e d  by t h e  r e i n s u r e r ,  o r  t h a t  t h e  above i n t e g r a l  e x i s t s .  
A s  a  m a r g i n a l  c a s e  P [ l l  i s  t h e  money t h e  r e i n s u r e r  i s  
r e q u i r e d  t o  pay $ 1  a t  t h e  end of t h e  p e r i o d  o f  t h e  c e d e n t ,  f o r  
c e r t a i n .  
1-7T I n  o t h e r  words  
71 
i s  t h e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e ,  and s i n c e  t h i s  must 
be  t h e  same f o r  any $, Eq. ( 3 )  i s  a  n o r m a l i z a t i o n  c o n d i t i o n .  
S i m i l a r  t o  e x p e c t a t i o n s  i n  p r o b a b i l i t y ,  one  c a n  show t h a t  
i f  $ = Z ( 5 )  I t h e n  
where P  ( x )  = P  ( Z  ( x )  1 z ' ( x )  1 by a  change of  v a r i a b l e s .  * 5  '4 
-- - 
* 
A way t o  t h i n k  of P  (y)  i s  a s  a  d i s t o r t i o n  of @ ( y ) ,  s a y  
'4 $ 2 
P y ( y )  = f + ( y )  @ $ ( y ) .  For  example, i f  f  ( y )  = a  + b y  and $ = ( 5 )  , 
2 '4 t h e n  f ( x )  = a  + bx ; t h i s  means t h a t  whereas t h e  r e i n s u r e r  5  
c a l c u l a t e s  t h e  premium u s i n g  t h e  f i r s t  moment f o r  $, he u s e s  
t h e  second moment f o r  5 .  However, i n  s t a n d a r d  i n s u r a n c e  t e r m i -  
nology,  t h i s  i m p l i e s  t h a t  w e  have d i f f e r e n t  c a l c u l a t i o n  p r i n c i -  
p l e s  f o r  d i f f e r e n t  r i s k s .  But t h i s  i s  a  m a t t e r  o f  p e r s u a s i v e  
d e f i n i t i o n .  
Before  w e  c o n t i n u e  t o  f o r m u l a t e  the d e c i s i o n  problem of 
o u r  i n i t i a l  I . C .  l e t  u s  n o t e  t h a t  
1) t h e r e  a r e  no  t r a n s a c t i o n  c o s t s  i n  r e i n s u r i n g ;  
2 )  borrowing and l e n d i n g  r a t e s  a r e  t h e  same; 
3 )  r e i n s u r a n c e  c o n t r a c t s  have a  span  of  o n e  p e r i o d ;  
i . e .  a t  the end of  t h e  p e r i o d  the r i s k s  r e a l i z e  
whatever  payments t o  b e  made a r e  made and the con- 
t r a c t  c e a s e s  t o  e x i s t .  
D .  Dynamic P r o g r a m i n g  F o r m u l a t i o n  
W e  w i l l  suppose t h a t  t h e  I . C .  knows* (o r  i s  a b l e  t o  f o r e -  
c a s t )  t h e  sequences  
The dynamic programming r e l a t i o n  (D.P.) f o r  t h e  N-period 
problem of t h e  I . C .  i s  
s u b j e c t  t o  
where nt - (x)  dx < 1. For  conven ience  i n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g ,  
* 
When w e  d e a l  w i t h  closed-form s o l u t i o n s  l a t e r  i n  t h i s  
p a p e r ,  w e  w i l l  s e e  t h a t  w e  on$y need t o  know t h e  sequences  
, where n  = j Pt ( x )  d x .  I n  o t h e r  words ,  w e  
t = N  t -  XL 1 - ITL 
- I; 
need a  f o r e c a s t  of t h e  i n t e r e k t  r a t e s  it = n  t 
w e  w i l l  d e n o t e  P  (x )  a s  P t ( x ) .  
E t  
Co n d i t i o n  (6)  i s  t h e  budget  c o n s t r a i n t .  S i n c e  t h e  re- 
i n s u r e r  i s  ready  t o  make any t r a n s a c t i o n  u s i n g  P  ( x ) ,  w e  r e q u i r e  t 
t h a t  t h e  r e i n s u r a n c e  t r e a t y  R (x )  have t h e  same v a l u e  a s  t h e  t-1 
i n i t i a l  s t a t e  of t h e  I . C . ,  t h a t  i s  
(Note t h a t  Rt - c  i s  t h e  p o s i t i o n  a f t e r  d i v i d e n d s  a r e  pa id  t 
i n  p e r i o d  t; i f  t h e  I . C .  d i d  n o t  r e i n s u r e ,  Rt - c would grow 
Rt - C t 
t o  by t h e  end of t h e  pe r i od  when premiums a r e  c o l l e c t e d  
*L L 
and c l a i m s  r e a l i z e d .  ) 
Looking now a t  t h e  DP r e l a t i o n  Eq. (5) , w e  see t h a t  
f  ( R  ) i s  t h e  maximum expected  u t i l i t y  f o r  a  t - pe r i od  problem t t  
s t a r t i n g  w i t h  r i s k  r e s e r v e s  l e v e l  Rt. I n  each pe r i od  t ,  t h e  
I . C .  h a s  t o  maximize ove r  a l l  p o s s i b l e  f u n c t i o n s  Rt - 1 ( ~ )  
( t h e  r e i n s u r a n c e  t r e a t y )  and a l s o  d e c i d e  on t h e  d iv idend  pay- 
ment, ct. 
The boundary c o n d i t i o n  f o r  t h e  DP r e l a t i o n  i s  
The answer t o  t h e  N-period problem i s  f  CR) . N 
111. Closed-Form S o l u t i o n s  
The problem formula ted  i n  t h e  l a s t  s e c t i o n  canno t ,  i n  
g e n e r a l ,  be so l v ed  a n a l y t i c a l l y .  I n  t h i s  s e c t i o n  w e  w i l l  f i n d  
closed-form s o l u t i o n s  when w e  a d d i t i o n a l l y  assume t h a t  t h e  one 
p e r i o d  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  of t h e  I . C .  be longs  t o  t h e  L inea r  Risk  
To le rance  (LRT) c l a s s .  
The LRT c l a s s  i s  d e f i n e d  as t h e  s o l u t i o n s  t o  t h e  e q u a t i o n  
u I1 e 
t 
- 
I e , a , b  reals ,  and n o t  b o t h  a  = 0 and b = 0 
u  ( x )  a x + b  
w i t h  ull ( x )  < 0 and u '  (x )  > 0. ( 8 )  
The s o l u t i o n s  t o  Eq .  (7)  g i v e  r ise  t o  
I )  a f O  , l e t  e = ca  
which i n  t u r n  g i v e s  rise t o  t h e  two s u b c l a s s e s  
(ax  + b) c + l  Ia )  u ( x )  = 
a ( c  +17 ; c f - 1  , a x + b > O  , a c < O  
and 
I n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  w e  w i l l  expand on class Ia which i s  t h e  r i c h e s t ,  
and w i l l  b r i e f l y  ment ion  t h e  r e s u l t s  f o r  t h e  c l a s s e s  Ib  and 11, 
as t h e  arguments  and d e r i v a t i o n s  are ana logous .  
(a )  Model Ia:  
( a x  + b) c + l  
u ( x )  = 
a ( c  + 1) , c f - 1  , a x + b > O  , a c < O  
t 11 
- U 
- i s  known as  t h e  P r a t t  [S] measure of r i s k  a v e r s i o n .  
1 
U 
u The i n v e r s e ,  - - 
I t  
i s  c a l l e d  Risk  To le rance .  The LRT c l a s s  
U 
w a s  i n v e s t i g a t e d  by Mossin [ 3 ] .  
Theorem I a .  I f  u (x )  i s  a s  above then t h e  s o l u t i o n  t o  t h e  
t + 1 per iod problem descr ibed  by Eqs. (5) , (6 )  and (8 )  i s  
given by: 
a s  long a s  a CA t+lRt+l + Bt+l) + b > 0 ,  where 
wi th  
and p IT t+lf t+l def ined  a s  before  
The optimal dividend i s  
The optimal re insurance  t r e a t y  t ransforms t h e  a s s e t s  of 
t h e  I . C .  t o  
where 
and t h e  s o l u t i o n  i s  un ique .  (These r e s u l t s  w i l l  b e  e x p l a i n e d  
l a t e r .  ) 
Proof .  The proof f i r s t  shows t h a t  t h e  theorem h o l d s  f o r  
t + 1 = 1; w e  t h e n  proceed by i n d u c t i o n .  Here w e  w i l l  expand 
on t h e  proof f o r  t + 1 = 1 a s  t h e  i n d u c t i o n  p a r t  i s  c o m p l e t e l y  
ana logous .  
Using t h e  boundary c o n d i t i o n  ( 8 )  f o r  t h e  l a s t  p e r i o d ,  
~ q s .  ( 5 )  and ( 6 )  become 
f  1 1  ( R  = max [ u ( c l )  + a E u ( R o ( < ) ) ]  
cl lRo (x )  
such  t h a t  
W e  u s e  max i n s t e a d  of s u p  i n  t h e  above s i n c e  w e  a r e  g o i n g  t o  
* 
demand t h a t  t h e  s o l u t i o n  be i n t e r i o r ,  i . e .  a c  + b  > 0  and 1 
aRo(x)  + b  > 0 ,  X E X ;  o t h e r w i s e  t h e  f u n c t i o n  u ( * )  i s  n o t  w e l l  
d e f i n e d ,  a t  l e a s t  f o r  t h e  c a s e  when c < -1. 
Now w e  w i l l  f i x  c  1' Then t h e  maximizat ion  of t h e  second 
t e r m  i n  Eq. (18)  s u b j e c t  t o  E q .  (19)  t e l l s  u s  t h a t  Ro(x) must 
s a t i s f y  
where h i s  g iven  by s u b s t i t u t i o n  i n  (191. Th i s  r e s u l t  f o l l ows  
from t h e  c a l c u l u s  of v a r i a t i o n s .  S ince  u ( - )  i s  a l s o  s t r i c t l y  
concave Eq. ( 2 0 )  i s  neces sa ry  and s u f f i c i e n t  and R (x)  i s  unique.  
0 
NOW by cho i ce  of u  ( * I ,  ( I a )  , u '  ( 0 )  has  a  r ange  of (Of..) ; 
t h u s  Eq. ( 2 0 )  always h a s  a  s o l u t i o n  a s  long a s  A > 0. Then 
wh i l e  s u b s t i t u t i n g  Eq. ( 2 1 )  i n  (19)  w e  have: 
w i t h  p l ,  ml d e f i n e d  a s  i n  ( 1 4 ) .  Since  w e  r e q u i r e  h > 0, w e  
a s k  $IC > 0 o r  
Now, by s u b s t i t u t i n g  Eqs. ( 2 1 )  and ( 2 2 )  i n  (18) and manipu la t ing ,  
w e  o b t a i n  
where w e  have used 
NOW t h e  second term i n  Eq. C241 i s  s t r i c t l y  concave  because  
of ~ q .  (232 and the f i r s t  t e r m  i s  s t r i c t l y  concave  a s  long  
a s  ac l  + b  > 0 .  Thus, d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g  w . r . t .  cl and e q u a t i n g  
t o  z e r o  w e  o b t a i n  t h e  un ique  s o l u t i o n  
w i t h  A , ,  B, a s  d e f i n e d  i n  the s t a t e m e n t  of  t h e  theorem. 
I I * * 
F u r t h e r ,  w e  f i n d  t h a t  f o r  c l  t h e  c o n d i t i o n  a c l  + b  > 0 is  
e q u i v a l e n t  t o  Eq. ( 2 3 ) .  Thus t h e  o n l y  c o n d i t i o n  needed i s  
* 
F i n a l l y ,  by s u b s t i t u t i n g  c i n  Eq. (241 w e  o b t a i n  1 
where Dl i s  d e f i n e d  i n  theorem. 
The i n d u c t i o n  s t e p  assumes 
and p r o v e s  t h e  r e s u l t  f o r  f t+l (Rt+l) The arguments  a r e  
ana logous  t o  t h e  l a s t - s t e p  c a s e .  
W e  w i l l  s imply  s t a t e  t h e  r e s u l t s  f o r  t h e  o t h e r  two models ,  
I b  and 11. 
( b )  Model I b  
1 
u ( x )  = - l o g  (ax  + b )  ; a > 0 , a x  + b  > 0 
a  
U '  (XI = ( a x  + b ) - I  . 
Theorem Ib .  I f  u(.xl i s  as above then t h e  s o l u t i o n  t o  t h e  
t + 1 period problem described by E q s .  (51, (61 and (81 is  
a s  long a s  
where 
with 
def ined a s  before ,  i . e .  
The optimal dividend i s  
The o p t i m a l  r e i n s u r a n c e  t r e a t y  t r a n s f o r m s  t h e  a s s e t s  o f  t h e  
I .C .  t o  
(36 )  
where 
F u r t h e r ,  t h e  s o l u t i o n  i s  u n i q u e .  
P r o o f .  ( o m i t t e d ;  s i m i l a r  t o  Theorem I a )  
Theorem 11. I f  u ( x )  i s  a s  above  t h e n  t h e  s o l u t i o n  t o  t h e  t + 1 
p e r i o d  problem d e s c r i b e d  by Eqs.  ( 5 )  , ( 6 )  and ( 8 )  i s  
where 
IT 
- -  .I lo,  a] 
Y A t  
w i t h  
a s  b e f o r e ,  and 
The op t ima l  d iv idend  i s  aga in  
The op t ima l  r e i n s u r a n c e  t r e a t y  t r a n s f o r m s  t h e  a s s e t s  of  
t h e  I.C. t o  
( 4 6 )  
o r  e q u i v a l e n t l y ,  
( 4 7 )  
Again,  t h e  s o l u t i o n  i s  unique.  
Proof .  (omi t ted ;  s i m i l a r  t o  I a )  . 
I V .  Remarks 
1. Looking a t  t h e  formulas f o r  d ividend payments Eqs. (151, 
(35)  , and (45) w e  s e e  t h a t  t hey  a r e  l i n e a r  i n  t h e  r i s k  r e s e r v e s  
l e v e l  Rt+l. 
* 
> 0. However, w e  d i d  n o t  c o n s t r a i n  t h e  problem t o  c ~ + ~  -
~ h u s  it i s  p o s s i b l e  t o  have nega t ive  d iv idends .  
S p e c i f i c a l l y ,  f o r  Model I a  we have t h e  fol lowing cases :  
* 
~ h u s ,  c  can be p o s i t i v e  o r  nega t ive  t 
* (b)  b  < 0 =+ct always nega t ive  . 
Case Ab can  be viewed a s  a  c h a r i t a b l e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  t h a t  expec t s  
t o  l o s e  a l l  t h e  t ime.  
* b  
B.  c  < 0 , a  > O + c t  > - -  
a  
* ( a )  b  > 0 + c t  p o s i t i v e  o r  nega t ive  , 
* 
( b )  b  < 0 + c t  always p o s i t i v e  
For t h e  o t h e r  c a s e s ,  nega t ive  d iv idends  simply mean t h a t  
i t  i s  t o  t h e  b e n e f i t  of t h e  s tockholders  t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e  cap i -  
t a l  of t h e  I .C .  i n  e x p e c t a t i o n  of f u t u r e  r e t u r n s ,  once they  
have decided t h a t  t hey  w i l l  s t a y  i n  bus ines s  u n t i l  t h e  N pe r iods  
have e l apsed .  
2 .  A l l  Models can be extended t o  t h e  i n f i n i t e  hor izon 
s t a t i o n a r y  c a s e  simply by t ak ing  N + m. 
3. The terms d e s c r i b i n g  t h e  a s s e t s  of t h e  I . C .  a f t e r  t h e  
r e in su rance  t r e a t y  can  be expla ined  f o r  EIodel I a  (16)  , (17) a s  
fo l lows:  
The I . C .  borrows the amount (L + 2) IT ,which grows 
At t + l  
Bt + - by t h e  end of  t h e  p e r i o d )  from t h e  r e i n s u r e r .  I t  t o  - 
aA t At 
sells i t s  p o r t f o l i o  of premiums and r i s k s  and i n  r e t u r n  a c c e p t s  
t h e  amount p t + l ~ t + l  - 
't+l' It  t h e n  forms the sum 
from which it g i v e s  a  p o r t i o n  A ( r e c a l l  0 < At < 1) t o  t h e  t - c 
s t ock h o l d e r s .  They pay back t o  t h e  I . C .  t h e  amount of  
*t+1 b  (which i s  t h e  c o s t  of buying --1, u n i  t s  of r i s k y  i n v e s t -  
- 
A /  At a a  
Then t h e  I . C .  u s e s  what i s  l e f t ,  i .e.  
t o  buy t h e  r i s k y  inves tment  a t  a  c o s t  o f  mt+l p e r  u n i t .  
( S i m i l a r  e x p l a n a t i o n s  ho ld  f o r  Models I b  and 11) 
i n c r e a s e s  i n  x ,  t h e n  R ( x )  d e c r e a s e s  i n  x  t 
f o r  a l l  models.  Th i s  i s  e a s y  t o  check and means t h a t  t h e  c e d e n t  
p a r t i c i p a t e s  p o s i t i v e l y  i n  t h e  l o s s e s ;  t h a t  i s ,  t h e  h ighe r  t h e  
c l a i m  t h e  lower h i s  r i s k  r e s e r v e  l e v e l  w i l l  be  a t  t h e  s t a r t  of 
p e r i o d  t. 
Also ,  l lPt+l(x '  i n c r e a s e s  w i t h  x"  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  t h e  premium 
-z= 
t h e  r e i n s u r e r  a s s i g n s  t o  r i s k s  w i t h  h i g h  d i s p e r s i o n  i s  h i g h e r  
t h a n  t o  t h e  premium w i t h  low d i s p e r s i o n - - t h i s  i s  q u i t e  r eason-  
a b l e .  
5. A g e n e r a l i z a t i o n  o f  t h e  problem c a n  b e  a c h i e v e d  i f  w e  
i n t r o d u c e  t h e  d e c i s i o n  t o  spend money f o r  s a l e s  promot ion .  I t  
t u r n s  o u t  t h a t  c u r r e n t  p o l i c i e s  d o  n o t  change  e x c e p t  f o r  t h e  
v a l u e  of Bt,  t h e  c o n s t a n t  amount p a i d  t o  t h e  s t o c k h o l d e r s .  
For  f u r t h e r  d e t a i l s  see [ 4 ] .  
6 .  Our r e s u l t s  r e semble  t h o s e  of  Hakansson [l] f o r  t h e  
i n v e s t m e n t  consumption problem of t h e  i n d i v i d u a l .  Hakansson 
was a b l e  t o  f i n d  c losed- form s o l u t i o n s  f o r  t h e  one  p e r i o d  
Y u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n s :  u l x )  = x , 0 < y  < 1; u ( x )  = - x ' ~ ,  y  > 0; 
u ( x )  = l o g  x  and u ( x )  = -e c y x r  y > 0. A p a r t  from d e c i d i n g  
on h i s  l e v e l  o f  consumption,  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  had t o  d e c i d e  on 
forming  a  l i n e a r  combina t ion  o f  a  f i x e d  f i n i t e  number of  i n -  
v e s t m e n t  o p p o r t u n i t i e s .  
I n  o u r  c a s e ,  t h e  company c h o o s e s  t h e  r e i n s u r a n c e  t r e a t y  
( t h u s  i t s  i n v e s t m e n t )  f o r  s o l v i n g  a  c a l c u l u s  of  v a r i a t i o n s  
problem, t h u s  s a t i s f y i n g  Eq. ( 2 0 ) .  T h i s  i s  e x a c t l y  t h e  r e a s o n  
why w e  w e r e  a b l e  t o  f i n d  c losed- form s o l u t i o n s  f o r  a  w ide r  
c l a s s  ( t h e  LRT c l a s s )  t h a n  t h a t  of  Hakansson. 
7 .  W e  w i l l  now d i s c u s s  t h e  c a s e s  when t h e  u t i l i t y  of  a  
consumption s t r e a m  i s  n o t  g i v e n  by (i) o r  E q .  1 b u t  by c a s e s  (ii) and 
(iii) m u l t i p l i c a t i v e  forms from page  4 .  F i r s t  w e  l e t  uk ( * I  
= u ( - ) ,  Vk. The D.P. r e l a t i o n  c a n  a g a i n  be f o r m u l a t e d  a s  
a l o n g  w i t h  t h e  budge t  c o n s t r a i n t  and t h e  boundary c o n d i t i o n  
where w e  have assumed t h a t  uk (.* 1 = u (-9 1 , k = 1,. , , , fJ .  The 
f o r mu l a t i o n  f o r  u  < 0 is  s i m i l a r :  
and h a s  t h e  same c o n s t r a i n t s  and boundary c o n d i t i o n .  
W e  n o t e  r i g h t  away t h a t  d i s c o u n t i n g  h a s  no meaning h e r e ,  
a s  it w i l l  n o t  a f f e c t  t h e  p o l i c i e s .  Using Eq. (481 and 
( ax  + b )  c + l  
u ( x I  = a ( c  + 1) , a > O  , - 1 < c < O  t 
o r  Eq. (49) and 
Cax + bl c + l  
u ( X )  = a ( c  + 1) , a > O  , c < - 1  , a x + b > O  , 
(51)  
w e  c an  a g a i n  f i n d  c losed-form s o l u t i o n s  t o  t h e  D . P .  problem 
of t h e  I . C .  
The s o l u t i o n  t o  t h e  t + 1 p e r i o d  problem f o r  Eqs. (48) 
and ( 5 )  i s  
a s  long a s  a(At+lRt+l 
+ B t + l  ) + b  > 0, where 
- 
- + - -  b  "k+l + - Bt IT b  
Bt+l - A t + l [ ~ t + l " t + l  P t + l  a  A~ A~ t + l  - -(t a  + 1 1 1  
where 
and 
a r e  a s  b e f o r e .  
The op t imal  d iv idend  payment i s  
The op t imal  r e i n s u r a n c e  t r e a t y  t r a n s fo rm s  t h e  w e a l t h  of 
t h e  I . C .  t o  
The s o l u t i o n  i s  a g a i n  unique.  
The proof i s  s i m i l a r  t o  t h a t  of  t h e  d i s c oun t e d  sum of 
u t i l i t i e s  c a s e  and w i l l  n o t  be p r e s e n t e d  he re .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  
t h e  above s o l u t i o n  i s  t h e  same f o r  Eqs. ( 4 9 )  and (511,  e x c e p t  
t h a t  now 
W e  see that t h e  o p t i m a l  p o l i c i e s  found f o r  the m u l t i -  
p l i c a t i v e  u t i l i t y  c a s e s  a r e  e s s e n t i a l l y  t h e  same a s  t h a t  of  
t h e  d i s c o u n t e d  sum approach.  W e  shou ld  n o t e ,  however, t h a t  
- ( r e c a l l  t h a t  At i s  t h e  p o r t i o n  o f  Rt d i s t r i b u t e d  At t + l  
a s  d i v i d e n d ) .  T h i s  o c c u r s  because  of  t h e  form o f  t h e  m u l t i -  
p l i c a t i v e  u t i l i t y  which g i v e s  e q u a l  v a l u e  t o  t h e  consumption 
( d i v i d e n d )  o f  a l l  p e r i o d s .  
We c a n n o t  a r g u e  a b o u t  what happens i n  t h e  l i m i t ,  a s  
t + m a s  Dt  h a s  no l i m i t  (see Eq. (54)  ) . 
F i n a l l y ,  w e  must r e a l i z e  t h a t  concern ing  t h e  d i s c o u n t e d  
N k  
sum of  u t i l i t i e s  U = L a u ( x k )  , a  change of u  t o  t h e  one- 
k=O 
p e r i o d  u t i l i t y  e q u i v a l e n t  a u  + b  p roduces  a  u t i l i t y  e q u i v a l e n t  
change i n  U ( t o  aU + b ) ;  i n  t h e  m u l t i p l i c a t i v e  u t i l i t y  c a s e  
N 
( U  = n u ( x k ) ,  however, a  u t i l i t y  e q u i v a l e n t  change i n  u  d o e s  
k=O 
n o t  r e s u l t  i n  a  u t i l i t y  e q u i v a l e n t  change i n  U ,  i .e .  A ,  B a r e  
-
such t h a t  
~ h u s  t h e  c losed-form r e s u l t s  found f o r  Eqs. (48)  and (49)  
a r e  l i m i t e d  t o  t h e  s p e c i f i c  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n s  (50)  and ( 5 1 ) ,  
r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  and d o  n o t  h o l d  f o r  any o t h e r  f u n c t i o n  t h a t  i s  
u t i l i t y  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  them. 
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